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PHILIP C. JESSUP
It is not the purpose of this article to enter upon a discussion
of the fundamental principles of restrictive immigration, nor to
speculate upon the pleasing possibility of Nordic supremacy.
It is intended rather to deal with concrete situations which have
arisen and will arise under the Immigration Act of 1924' and to
consider the interpretation of the Act by the courts and by the
administrative authorities charged with its execution. It will
be convenient first to outline the act briefly in order that its
provisions may be in mind, and to touch even more lightly upon
its historical antecedents in American legislation.2
What may be called the basic exclusion act from the viewpoint
of individual qualification, is the Immigration Act of February
5, 1917.- Section 3 of that Act in great detail and at great length
lists the classes of persons who are debarred from entering the
country. Its provisions are generally familiar, but may be sum-
marized as forbidding the entry of persons diseased in body,
mind or morals, likely to become a public charge,' holding what
are deemed anti-social views, coming under contract to labor and
persons from the "barred zone" of the East. To all of these
exclusion provisions there are exceptions which it is unnecessary
to enumerate.
The other act of major importance is the so-called "Quota Act"
1 Act of MKay 26, 1924 (43 Stat. at L. 153). For an analysis of the Act
as a whole, see Trevor, An Aizalysis of the Anzcrican 12nmigratiz' Act of
1924, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION (Sept. 1924) 375, No. 202.
2 A reference to two of the more important antecedent laws is the more
necessary because See. 25 of the 1924 Act provides that "The provisions
of this Act are in addition to and not in substitution for the provisions of
the immigration laws. . .
3 39 Stat. at L. 874.
This is the class known to the immigration officials as "L. P. C." which
seems to have become a blanket exclusion provision. Apparently any alien
subject to deportation is considered "likely to become a public charge," on
the theory that he may be taken into custody and held at the public expense.
The courts have generally not followed the immigration officials in this
construction. Nocchi v. Johnson (1925, C. C. A. 1st) 6 Fed. (2d) 1; United
Stat-es ex rel. Mantler r. Comminssioner (1924, C. C. A. 2d) 3 Fed. (2d)
234; Lisotta v. United States (1924, C. C. A. 5th) 3 Fed. (2d) 103; In re
Kgshishian (1924, S. D. N. Y.) 299 Fed. 804; cf. contra: Ez parte Honz
(1923, W. D. Wash.) 292 Fed. 455.
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of May 19, 1921.5 Section 2 of this law introduced the principle
of numerical limitations in the form of quotas, based upon a per-
centage of residents of various nationalities in the United States.
Certain classes were not to be counted in estimating the quotas,
or in other words, they were exempt from the numerical limita-
tion. Such classes included, inter alia, government officials, tour-
ists, transients, and some professional groups and residents of
other countries of the Western Hemisphere. Preference was also
provided-for certain relatives. The administration of this act
inevitably involved great hardship. Consular officers who issued
the visas to embarking aliens all over the world, could not keep
accurate count of the total number of visas issued and the result-
ing exhaustion of the respective quotas, with the result that
shiploads of aliens raced for our ports, each hoping to arrive
before the quota was filled. Thousands who had sold their homes
and possessions to embark for the land of promise were turned
back at the doors and returned, often in despair and destitution,
to the lands from which they came. Thousands more were found
unfit under the provision of section 3 of the 1917 Act and were
also compelled to retrace their steps.
The Immigration Act of 1924 may be said to have had two
major purposes; first, to limit further the total number of aliens
who should be allowed to enter, i.e., to reduce the quotas ;G and
second, to alleviate the hardship of rejections at American ports
by entrusting to consular officers in the field the preliminary
duty of selection and rejection and the prevention of an over-
issue of visas through the medium of monthly maximums of
10% of the annual quota. 7 The new power extended to consular
officers is contained in Section 2 (f) of the Act, which provides:-
"No immigration visa shall be issued to an immigrant if it
appears to the consular officer, from statements in the application,
or in the papers submitted therewith, that the immigrant is
inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws,
nor shall such immigration visa be issued if the application fails
542 Stat. at L. 5, as amended May 11, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 540).
6 See. 11 of the Act contains the numerical quota provisions. Subdivision
(a) fixes the annual quotas for 1924-1927 at 2 percent of the number of
foreign-born individuals of a given nationality resident in the continental
United States, as determined by the United States Census of 1890, Sub-
division (b) introduces a complicated system to commence July 1, 1927,
which will further restrict the total number and give proportionately
greater representation to the so-called Nordic races. The net reduction
under the existing quota as compared with the quotas under the 1921 law
is 193,136, a present total of 164,667 as against a former 357,803. See U.
S. Dep't of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Im-
migration (1924) 27. On this phase of the Act see Parker, Tho Quota
Provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924 (1924) 18 Am. JouR. INT. LAW,
737.
7 Sec. 11 (f).
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to comply with the provisions of this Act, nor shall such immigra-
tion visa be issued if the consular officer knows or has reason to
believe that the immigrant is inadmissible to the United States
under the immigration laws."
Paragraph (g) of the same section provides that the visa
issued by the consul shall not be conclusive of the alien's right
to enter the United States if upon arrival he is found to be
inadmissible., Even with this qualification on the consular power
it is obvious that fewer rejections will occur at the port after the
weeding-out process abroad; and in practice this has been the fact.
Systematizing and modifying the exceptions in the 1921 Act,
the Act of 1924 proceeds to classify aliens into non-immigrants,
non-quota immigrants, preferred quota immigrants and quota
immigrants. The non-immigrant classes include: (1) Govern-
ment officials, (2) visitors, (3 and 4) transients, (5) seamen,
and (6) so-called treaty merchants. The non-quota group'0 com-
prises: (a) certain relatives of resident American citizens, (b)
returning resident aliens, (c) persons born in other American
countries, (d) ministers and professors, and (e) students. Pref-
erence is accorded" to certain other relatives of American citizens
and to farmers.
Attention must also be drawn to the special exclusion pro-
vision of the Act.12  No immigrant 3 is admitted without an
immigration visa which must be properly issued. With certain
exceptions aliens ineligible to citizenship are excluded,0 this
being the famous (or notorious) provision which provoked the
controversy with Japan.
In analysing the interpretation of the Act it will be convenient
to follow the groupings laid down therein. It must be borne in
mind that the new function of the consular officers has for the
first time in our history given the Department of State, under
whose direction these officers operate, a major r6le in the ad-
ministration of the immigration laws-a task hitherto confided
8 That this was true also under previously existing law, see Unitcd StatcG





23 This does not include the non-immigrant group, and exception is
specifically made of a child born subsequent to the issue of a visa to the
accompanying parent [Sec. 13 (a)], and of a returning resident alien,
"as may he by regulation prescribed" [See. 13 (b)]. By very sensible
interpretation a child born during the temporary visit abroad of an alien
mother who has previously been legally admitted to the United States, is
likewise exempted from the necessity of securing a visa. See General
Instruction Circular to Consular Officers, No. 926, Diplomatic Serial No.
273 (1925), Par. 5,-hereinafter cited as G. I. C. 926.
*4 Sec. 13 (c). See Parker, The Ineligble to Citienship Proz*is of
the Immigration Act of 1924 (1925) 19 AnL. JoiM INT. LAW, 23.
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solely or principally to the Department of Labor. At present,
in effect, the Department of State controls the issuance of visas
in the first instance, while the Department of Labor retains the
final control at the ports.15
NON-IMMIGRANTS
Although the Act of 1924 says nothing about documentation
of non-immigrants, the rules and regulations prescribe that they
shall bear passports visaed by consular officers.10
The first class of non-immigrants is that of Government officials
with their families and retinues. T Very properly they have
always been placed under our immigration laws in a favored
position, free from the exacting requirements of the law. This
group includes officers of any rank of foreign governments,
whether national, provincial, state or municipal."" It does not,
however, include officials of the United States. 0
An interesting question is presented by the case of an official
of a foreign government which has not been recognized by the
United States. If the government exists de facto, it would seem
that its representative would be entitled to this classification.
Nor does it appear that the issuance of a visa, under Section 3
(1), to such an individual would constitute recognition of his
15 Sec. 24 seems to give the Labor Department a measure of control over
the Department of State, providing:
"The Commissioner General, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor,
shall prescribe rules and regulations for the enforcement of the provisions
of this Act; but all such rules and regulations, in so far as they relate to
the administration of this Act by consular officers, shall be prescribed by
the Secretary of State on the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor.'
But in practice, the special interests and information of the State Depart-
ment have been recognized, and the control of the consuls has not been
divested from the Secretary of State.
16 G. I. C. 926, par. 10. The authority for this regulation is found in
Exec. Order No. 4125 of Jan. 12, 1925 which is based in part on Sec. 1 of
the Act of May 22, 1918 (40 Stat. at L. 559) as amended by the Appro-
priation Act of March 2, 1921 (41 Stat. at L. 1205, 1217). The pertinent
portions are printed at pp. 64-65 of U. S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Immi-
gration pamphlet, "Immigration Laws and Rules of July 1, 1925," here-
inafter cited as Labor Rules of 1925. Sec. 2 (f) of the Act, already
referred to, gives consuls authority to refuse visas to "immigrants," but
nothing is said concerning the refusal of visas to "non-immigrants." The
Act (See. 3) defines an immigrant as "any alien departing from any place
outside the United States destined for the United States" except the six
non-immigrant classes already mentioned. The immigration visa provided
for in the Act is not the usual stamp on a passport, but a separate docu-
ment. See Sees. 2 (a) and 7.
As to criminal liability for entering without a visa under the order and
acts above cited, see Flora v. Rustad (1925, C. C. A. 8th) 8 Fed. (2d) 335.
17Sec. 3 (1).
18 G. I. C. 926, par. 39.
19 Ibid. par. 41. When the Act is amended more consideration should be
shown the foreign wives of American Foreign Service Officers.
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government by the United States. On the other hand it may well
be argued that the concessions made in the law to government
officials are acts of courtesy only based on international comity,
and as the New York Court of Appeals has said, there is no
comity with an unrecognized government. -0 It is understood that
the State Department has taken the view that a visa may be issued
to such persons as government officials, at least when the de facto
character of the government is fully admitted.21
The second non-immigrant class22 causes probably more diffi-
culty to both consular and immigration officials than any other.
It is composed of the temporary visitors, or, as the act styles
them, aliens "visiting the United States temporarily as a tourist
or temporarily for business or pleasure." Such a person is thus
defined by the administrative Departments:
"'An alien visiting the United States temporarily as a tourist
or temporarily for business or pleasure' shall be construed to
mean an alien who, having a fixed domicile in some other country
which he has no intention to abandon, comes to the United States
to remain for a temporary period only." 2-
Although the Department of Labor has relaxed the severity of
its early rulings under which "temporary" and "six months" were
almost synonomous, that period is still basic. Nevertheless, the
port authorities may admit for any period not exceeding one year
without reference to the Department at Washington. If the port
-O Russian Socialist Federated Soziet Republic v. Cibrario (1923) 235
N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259.
21 It is doubtful whether the courtesy of such a visa would he granted
to an officer of the Soviet government. It does not seem unreasonable to
allow the State Department a certain discretion in the application of this
part of the law.
Another interesting question of recognition may be mentioned here.
Section 12 (c) provides for the allotment of quotas to new countries, "the
Governments of which are recognized by the United States." The Ar-
menian Government recognized by the United States in 1920, had ceased
to exist when the President on June 30, 1924, proclaimed the quotas under
the 1924 Act (Proclamation No. 1703). Nevertheless, a quota of 124
was allotted to Armenia. The Proclamation concludes with this "General
Note":
"The immigration quotas assigned to the various countries and quota-
areas should not be regarded as having any political significance whatever,
or as involving recognition of new governments, or of new boundaries, or
of transfers of territory except as the United States Government has al-
ready made such recognition in a formal and official manner."
The then existing Government of Armenia had not been so recognized by
the United States. There would thus seem to be a conflict between the
terms of the law and the terms of the Proclamation, but since recognition
is a purely executive function, it is believed that under international law
the proclamation would control and therefore the assignment of the quota
would not constitute recognition.
22 Sec. 3 (2).
2 G. I. C. 926, par. 43
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authorities are not satisfied concerning the temporary nature of
the visit, a bond, in the sum of $500 is exacted, conditioned upon
departure within a fixed time.24  The opportunity for fraud in
these cases it apparent, and unfortunately there are many ready
to grasp it; $500 is not considered an excessive sum to pay for a
chance to stay in America. Once admitted, the alien hopes he
or she will be lost in the multitude, thus rendering deportation
impossible.
The State Department has laid down for the guidance of con-
sular officers sensible general rules by which they are to be
governed in issuing visas under section 3 (2) .2 Some weight is
to be attached to the general financial situation and standing of
the alien, the presumption being that the visit of a poor laborer
accompanied by his whole family is less likely to be of a purely
temporary character than is that of a well-to-do business man.
A wife alleging that she wishes to pay a temporary visit to her
husband in the United States is naturally suspected of an intent,
or at last of a strong desire which may ripen into an intent, to
remain here permanently. On the other hand, strong home ties
abroad weigh in the applicant's favor.
At this point it may well be pointed out that the officials
charged with the administration of the Act are frequently un-
fairly accused of being inhuman and unnecessarily harsh. Friends
of an alien, who, they know, is a perfectly bona fide visitor,
become incensed at a consul's or immigration official's insistence
upon adequate proof of the individual's intention. Both have
their justification; but the official's case has less heart appeal
and receives far less sympathy. Although legitimate causes for
complaint no doubt exist, it must be borne in mind that the
thousands of frauds which are constantly practiced must neces-
sarily put any conscientious officer on his guard, and the innocent
must suffer for the sins of the guilty. You may be certain that
Mrs. A.'s word can be accepted as gospel, but the officer has also
to remember the cases of Mrs. B, C, D, . . . X, Y and Z,
among whom several have proved untruthful. It is common
knowledge that many a good church-goer recites with pride the
success with which articles have been brought through the cus-
toms without being declared or with a declaration of part value.
The discourtesy of some customs officials or a disagreement with
the principle of the protective tariff as applied to the individual
IftIbid. par. 44 and Labor Rules of 1925, Rule 3, Subdivision H. That
six months is a reasonable limit for a temporary visit, see U. S. ox rotl.
Devenuto v. Curran (1924 C. C. A. 2d) 299 Fed. 206; U. S. ex rot. Ran-
dazzo v. Tod (1924 C. C. A. 2d) 297 Fed. 214. For the Department of
Labor's earlier rule and for an example of the difficulties involved in cases
of temporary visitors, see Chryssikos v. Commissioner (1924, C. C. A. 2d)
3 Fed. (2d) 372.
25 G. I. C. 926, pars. 46-52.
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tourist seems a sufficient balm to even a rigorous conscience.
The number of persons who deem it a virtue, or at least no wrong,
to violate the 18th Amendment, is well known. A somewhat
similar attitude has developed with respect to the immigration
laws. If a friend or a servant has through ignoranci been placed
in a position where immediate and regular permanent entry has
become impossible, it is apparently not considered very repre-
hensible to endeavor to secure an entry on a plea of a temporary
visit, and thereafter to employ all available influence to regularize
permanent residence. How then can the administrative officers
be blamed for their skepticism?
A common situation against which the Department warns con-
sular officers to be on their guard is one in which an alien origi-
nally applies for a quota visa for the purpose of going to the
United States to live. After being told that the quota is full,
the alien suddenly decides he merely wants to go to the United
States for a temporary visit. He may go so far as to ash at the
same time that he be left on the waiting list for a quota number.
As the Department says, "the two applications are mutually in-
consistent," _1- and it is a fair presumption that in reality the
applicant is not a bona fide tourist or one coming temporarily for
business or pleasure. It is, however, merely a presumption and
may be rebutted.
The whole tenor of sections 2 and 7 of the Act is believed to
indicate that the law contemplates that the immigrant shall ap-
pear in person before the consular officer in order to receive his
visa. It is therefore not the practice to permit an alien to re-
ceive his visa by mail after his arrival in this country. It would
obviously be contrary to the intent of the Act to permit large
numbers of aliens to enter the country as temporary visitors
here to await the receipt of an immigration visa. Moreover, an
alien entering with such intention would not legally be entitled
in the first instance to a visa under Section 3 (2).
The provisions for transients are not of particular interest
here; but it may be mentioned that one of the common ruses
adopted to secure entry into the United States when quota num-
bers are not available is for an alien in Canada to purchase a
steamship ticket from New York to Europe, willingly sacrificing
the passage price after he has crossed the border with a transit
visa. The sum thus lost would probably be much less than that
exacted by an "immigrant bootlegger" who may, in the bargain,
leave his victim at some lonely border point stripped of all his
possessions if not of life itself.
Alien seamen, landing on shore leave, or for the purpose of
2G Ibid. par. 52.
27 Sees. 3 (3) and (4).
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"reshipping foreign" 28 are also classed as non-immigrants."'
This class is likewise prolific of law evasions, since many aliens
ship as seamen for the voyage to America with the sole purpose
of deserting upon arrival. Unfortunately it seems that the steam-
ship companies are not uniformly rigorous in ascertaining that
persons signed on in the crew are in fact seamen and not immi-
grants. The law applicable to seamen is unusually complex and
confusing and will not be gone into,30 but one problem is of general
interest. The historic position of the United States in protecting
all seamen serving on its vessels, is well known 1 For certain
purposes at least, an alien serving on an American vessel is an
American. For purposes of the immigration laws, however, the
Supreme Court has held that the term "alien seamen" means
"seamen who are aliens." 32
From the viewpoint of international law, the treaty merchant
class is the most interesting in the whole Act. Section 3 (6)
classifies as a non-immigrant, "an alien entitled to enter the
United States solely to carry on trade under and in pursuance of
'the provisions of a present existing treaty of commerce and
navigation." This clause has already been before the Supreme
Court in the case of Cheung Sum Shee et al. v. Nagle" and a
consideration of this case will disclose the nature of the problems.
A Chinese merchant vas domiciled in the United States, having
lawfully entered under Article H of the Treaty of Nov. 17, 18801
between the United States and China, and the so-called Chinese
Exclusion Acts.35 On July 11th, 1924, his wife and minor child
sought to enter to join him permanently under the provisions of
Sec. 3 (6) of the 1924 Act. They were excluded by the immi-
gration officials on the ground that they were barred under Sec.
13 (c) of the 1924 Act, which provides:
28 That is, on leaving the employment of one vessel and coming ashore
to seek an engagement on another.
29 Sec. 3 (5).
30 See Labor Rules of 1925, Rule 6, and for documentation of vessels and
crew list visas, see Department of State Diplomatic Serial No. 333, Jan.
12, 1925, cited in G. I. C. 926, par. 55; see Trevor, op. cit., note 1, pp,
396-397.
31 See 3 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906) sec. 484.
32 United States v. New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co. decided Dec.
14, 1925, not yet reported. Although it was the act of Dec. 26, 1920 (41
Stat. at L. 1082) which was before the Court, it seems probable from the
reasoning of the opinion that a like construction would be placed upon the
same words in the 1924 Act. Cf. 4 Moore Digest of International Law
(1906) sec. 566.
33 (1925) 268 U. S. 336, 45 Sup. Ct. 539.
3422 Stat. at L. 826, 827; 1 Malloy, Treaties (1910) 237.
35 Act of May 6, 1882, (22 Stat. at L. 58) as amended by Act of July
5, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 115) U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 4293.
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"(c) No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the
United States unless such alien (1) is admissible as a non-quota
immigrant under the provisions of subdivision (b), (d), or (e)
of section 4, or (2) is the wife, or the unmarried child under 18
years of age, of an immigrant admissible under such subdivision
(d), and is accompanying or following to join hiin, or (3) is not
an immigrant as defined in section 3."
It was argued that they were not non-immigrants as defined in
Section 3 because Section 5 provides: "An alien who is not
particularly specified in this act as a . . . non-immigrant shall
not be admitted as a . . . non-immigrant by reason of relation-
ship to any individual who is so specified. . . ." Since the
wife and child were not coming "solely to carry on trade", the
Secretary of Labor contended they were not "particularly speci-
fied" in Sec. 3 (6). The aliens sought release by habeas corpus,
but the writ was denied by the District Court?3 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which an appeal was
taken, certified the question to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile
the Secretary of State took up the cudgels in behalf of the aliens,
on the ground that the Treaty of 1880 gave them a privilege to
enter and that the Immigration Act did not destroy the privilege.A3
It was natural that Secretary Hughes should be peculiarly
interested in this case, since it involved the two sections of the
Act in connection with which he had waged a valiant though
partly unsuccessful battle with Congress while the Act was in
course of passage. The first draft of the House bill proceeded
on the theory that the treaty obligations of the United States were
fully met by what is now Sec. 3 (2) -the temporary visitor pro-
visionA8 Secretary Hughes was not satisfied and suggested an
additional provision reading, "An alien entitled to enter the
United States under the provisions of a treaty". Later he agreed
to the inserting of the word "existing" before "treaty". The
House Committee added other qualifications until the clause stood
in its present form, which the Committee believed "fully satisfied
treaty requirements." In the Senate, this provision, already
: (1924, N. D. Calif.) 2 Fed. (2d) 995.
37 The State Department has vigorously and properly maintained that
when treaty questions are involved, the Department of Labor should yield
to their interpretation. The Secretary of Labor has generally seemed to
realize the reasonableness of this stand, although both admit that the law
places upon the Labor Department the duty of enforcing the immigration
laws at the ports.
-8 For these and other facts cited in this connection, see Report of the
House Committee on Immigration, accompanying the introduction of the
"Johnson Bill," H. R. 7995, Report No. 350, H. R. 6Sth Congrezs, 1st ses-
sion, March 24, 1924, and Memorandum of Charles Cheney Hyde, Solicitor
for the Department of State, Feb. 18, 1925, approved by the Secretary
of State Feb. 19, 1925, printed as an appendix to the brief of the United
States in the case under discussion, hereinafter cited as "Solicitor's Memo."
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adopted by the House, was sponsored by Senator Shortridge, who-
insisted that "All those who are admissible into this country
under any existing treaty of commerce and navigation are to be
admitted under this act." 39
As already mentioned, Sec. 13, excluding aliens ineligible to
citizenship, is the core of the dispute with Japan which is un-
fortunately only too well remembered in both this country and
that. Although it was Japan which voiced the protest, the section
of course applied equally to Chinese and other non-white races.
The immigration of these peoples was already strictly limited,
so that the real basis of objection was not the general exclusion
policy, but the method and manner employed. As a question of
international law it is believed that immigration being a domestic
question, a state may discriminate against certain aliens, provided
the discrimination amounts merely to reasonable classification.
The problem may be compared to those classification questions
arising under the equal protection clause of our Constitution. If
this premise be granted it seems that assimilability-which is
the theoretic basis of eligibility for citizenship-may readily be
conceded to be a reasonable basis for classification.0 Such legal
justification, however, will not serve to prevent the feeling of
wounded pride which is the enevitable concomitant of such
discrimination, and-in popular contemplation the fact will always
overshadow the law.
The importance of these phases of our immigration law are
believed to warrant this digression from the case under discus-
sion. When the case came before the Supreme Court, the Chinese
appellants were represented by an imposing array of distin-
guished counsel. The United States as appellee was in the rather
amusing position of having one executive Department on one
side of the question, another on the other, and a third presenting
the case neutrally. The Department of Justice pointed out the
disagreement for the Court's benefit, defended the Labor Depart-
ment's position in 18 pages, and gave over 30 pages to a memo-
randum prepared by the State Department. Moreover, the As-
sistant to the Attorney General who had the case in charge refused
to argue the case orally, allowing it to stand on the brief.
3o See Solicitor's Memo, p. 26 and, more fully, pages 25-33.
40 It seems sometimes to be assumed that the United States is alone in
barring aliens upon racial grounds. That such is not the case will be
apparent from an examination of pages 177-188 of a publication of the
International Labour Office (1922) under the title, Emigration and Itnmi-
gration; Legislation and Treaties, where the laws of Argentine, Australia,
Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, New Zealand,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, the United States, Uruguay and
Venezuela are analyzed. See also Trevor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 389
et seq. and texts of Japanese-American notes relative to the point in ques-
tion, ibid. at 434 et seq.
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The position of the Department of Labor has been already
explained; it was a strong position. The bare language of the
Act was in its favor. The Department of State based its case on
the Supreme Court's oft-reiterated canon of construction that an
act of Congress will never be construed to violate a treaty if any
other construction is possible. They then demonstrated that the
treaty gave the wife and child a right to enter.- This is believed
to have been also the actual basis of the court's opinion, in which
it is said:
"The wives and minor children of resident Chinese merchants
were guaranteed the right of entry by the treaty of 10O80 and cer-
tainly possessed it prior to July first, when the present immigra-
tion act became effective. (United States v. Mrs. Gue Lin, supra.)
That act must be construed with the view to preserve treaty rights
unless clearly annulled, and we cannot conclude that, considering
its history, the general terms therein disclose a congressional in-
tent absolutely to exclude the petitioners from entry.
"In a certain sense it is true that petitioners did not come
'solely to carry on trade.' But Mrs. Gue Lim did not come as a
'merchant.' She was nevertheless allowed to enter, upon the
theory that a treaty provision admitting merchants by necessary
implication extended to their wives and minor children. This
rule was not unknown to Congress when considering the act now
before us.
"Nor do we think the language of section 5 is sufficient to defeat
the rights which petitioners had under the treaty. In a very
definite sense they are specified by the act itself as 'uuialm~d-
grants.' They are aliens entitled to enter in pursuance of a treaty
as interpreted and applied by this court 25 years ago."
Indeed a Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to say
that this decision of the Supreme Court holds that "nothing con-
tained in that act . . abrogated or destroyed e:dsting treaty
rights." 42 This is too broad a statement, since unfortunately
it may be pointed out that the wives of Chinese students have a
clear right under the treaty which no reasonable interpretation
could preserve under the Act.'
Although the Department of State made a good argument in
interpreting the difficult words, "particularly specified", as used
in Section 5, the Supreme Court's decision is believed to be nota-
ble as an illustration of the vigor of the presumption against the
legislative abrogation of a treaty.
It being established that the wife and minor child of a mer-
41 The Supreme Court had so decided in Unitcd States v. Mrs. Gue Lim
(1900) 176 U. S. 459, 20 Sup. Ct. 415.
4 ' Dang Foo v. Weedin (1925, C. C. A. 9th) 8th Fed. (2d) 221, 222.
43 Students ineligible to citizenship are admissible under Sees. 4 (e) and
13 (c) (1). In enumerating the non-quota classes in Sec. (4) mention
is expressly made of the wives and minor children of non-quota nationals
(See. 4 (c) ), and of non-quota professors and ministers (See. 4 (d) ),




chant may enter under Section 3 (6)," the question arises, what
is a merchant? The complete answer lies in a thorough study of
the laws and regulations relating to Chinese, which is in itself an
exhaustive field, treated by the two Departments as a subject
separate from immigration in general. 4  It will be sufficient to
state here that before the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924,
the term "merchant" included one engaged in local trade.4  In
interpreting Section 3 (6) of the Immigration Act of 1924, the
State Department held that only those coming to carry on inter-
national trade between the United States and the territory of the
other contracting party4 7 were to be classed as "treaty mer-
chants". "The distinction to be observed is between the case of
one engaged in trade or commerce between the two countries and
the case of an immigrant or settler who seeks to come without
such a relation to commerce, but who thereafter may engage in
purely local transactions which lie outside the purposes of the
commercial treaties." 48
The theory on wliich this interpretation is based is believed
to be this: when two nations conclude a commercial treaty, they
do so with the idea of promoting their mutual trade; it is not to
be assumed that Great Britain, for example, would trouble to
make a treaty for the purpose of affording facilities to those of
her subjects who, severing all ties with their native land, settle
down in the United States for the purpose of vending peanuts
on the street or managing a cafeteria; Great Britain is interested
rather in those business men who come and go, developing the
British import and export trade with the United States. This is
believed to be a reasonable interpretation of the usual provisions
of such treaties granting freedom to enter, travel and reside in
the territory of the other party. But the Chinese Treaty presents
44 The State Department has properly applied the Court's ruling to all
nationalities. See G. I. C. 926, par. 62. See also Labor Rules 1925, Rule
3, Subdivision H, par. 3. But see Ex parte So Hakp Yon (1924, W. D.
Wash.) 1 Fed. (2d) 814. It was recently held in Jeu Jo Wan v. Nagle
(1925, C. C. A., 9th) 9 Fed. (2d) 309 that the only treaty rights preserved
by the Immigration Act are those relating to merchants, and that a
Chinese teacher who was privileged to enter under the Chinese treaty was
excluded under the Immigration Act of 1924.
45 It will be noted that neither G. I. C. 926 nor Labor Rules of 1925 deals
with Chinese, separate instructions being issued for this purpose. See for
example, G. I. C. 926, par. 23.
46 See Weedin v. Wong Tat Hing (1925, C. C. A. 9th) 6 Fed. (2d) 201;
Weedin v. Wong Jun (1925, C. C. A. 9th) 7 Fed. (2d) 311; and authorities
there cited.
47 The treaty itself may limit the territory involved, as e.g. Article I of
the Convention of Commerce and Navigation of July 3, 1815 between Great
Britain and the United States [1 Malloy, Treaties (1910) 624], which re-
fers merely to "the territories of His Britannick Majesty in Europe," and
does not therefore include the British dominions.
48 G. I. C. 926, pars. 58-9.
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special difficulties. In its inception it was without doubt an Im-
migration Treaty and not a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.
As an immigration treaty it was properly construed to admit local
merchants, the distinction contemplated being between laborers
and merchants, and not between international and local traders.
But Congress evidently intended to include the Chinese Treaty in
Section 3 (6), although it specified treaties "of commerce and
navigation." 4 So far as merchants were covered by the Chinese
Treaty, therefore, it was held by the State Department to be a
commercial treaty. 0 As such, however, it must obviously be
subjected to the same interpretation as other commercial treaties,
that is, it must be construed as admitting only international and
not local merchants. The resulting situation is that the Act of
1924 must be considered as cutting off the treaty right of local
Chinese merchants to enter the country, since that right now
could only be predicated on Section 3 (6).
Admittedly this is rather an involved question; and it is not
surprising to find the courts abiding by their old construction and
admitting local Chinese merchants as before.'1 Since the result
operates to sustain our treaty obligations to China, it is to be
welcomed.
Section 3 (6) presents another interesting problem. Suppose
the X. Company, an American corporation, is engaged in exporting
machinery to England. It has offices in both London and New
York. A, an Englishman, is employed in the London office. The
company desires to transfer him to the New York office. May A
enter the United States under Section 3 (6) ? It will perhaps be
admitted that the X Company cannot, as to entry into the United
States, claim the rights accorded to British subjects under the
treaty.52 A's status as a treaty merchant depends upon his con-
nection with the X Company. Nevertheless, it is believed that A
in his own right may properly claim that he is promoting trade
between the two countries, and is therefore to be included in this
non-immigrant class. The opinion of the Departments in this
matter is not yet known.
It will be recalled that Section 3 (6) refers to "present existing
treaties". The object of this limitation obviously was to allow
Congress to keep control of immigration and to prevent the
Executive from entering into international engagements which
might let down the bars. Of course the Senate would still exercise
49 This is apparent from the Congressional Debates; see Solicitor's Memo.
pp. 25-35.
50 See G. I. C. 926, p. 120, appendix D.
51 See Weedin v. Wong Tat Hing, op. cit. supra note 46.
52 It happens that the British Treaty confers rights, not upon British
subjects, but upon "inhabitants of His Britannick Majesty's po-zesions




a control upon the treaty-making -power; but the House of Rep-
resentatives, to which immigration is an especial concern, evi-
dently preferred not to risk this domestic affair even to a highly
domestic Senate. If the Senate, however, should advise and con-
sent to the ratification of a treaty admitting, let us say, all French
miners, the later treaty would of course override the earlier Act;
and such aliens could enter under the former regardless of the
latter. On December 8th, 1923, the United States concluded a
commercial treaty with Germany, providing in Article I that:
"The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall
be permitted to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the
other; to exercise liberty of conscience and freedom of worship;
to engage in professional, scientific, religious, philanthropic, manu-
facturing and commercial work of every kind without interfer-
ence; to carry on every form of commercial activity which is not
forbidden by the local law; to own, erect or lease and occupy ap-
propriate buildings and to lease lands for residential, scientific,
religious, philanthropic, manufacturing, commercial and mor-
tuary purposes; to employ agents of their choice, and generally
to do anything incidental to or necessary for the enjoyment of any
of the foregoing privileges upon the same terms as nationals of
the state of residence or as nationals of the nation hereafter to
be most favored by it, submitting themselves to all local laws and
regulations duly established".5
3
The Senate advised and consented to ratification, with the reser-
vation that "there shall be added to Article -I of said treaty the
following: 'Nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect
existing statutes of either country in relation to the immigration
of aliens or the right of either country to enact such statutes.' "
The immigration laws of the United States provided that only
those with rights under treaties in force July 1, 1924 might enter;
the German treaty was not then in force; the treaty (that is the
reservation which forms part thereof) provides that the treaty
shall not affect the immigration law; the conclusion that a Ger-
man merchant cannot claim a right to enter under the treaty and
Section 3 (6) seems unfortunate but inescapable. An amend-
ment to the statute provides the only way out. Of course he may
still enter as a temporary visitor under Section 3 (2) ; but in this
way his stay is more restricted than it would be under the treaty
provision.
With final reference to Section 3 (6) two points may be noted.
First, the Department of Labor has ruled that the contract labor
provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1917 do not apply to treaty
merchants. A laborer is of course not a merchant; but the line
becomes shadowy when various classes of "brain workers" are
considered.1.4 Second, the Departments have been commendably
r3 United States Treaty Series No. 725.
4 Cf. Ex parte Gouthro (1924, E. D. Mich.) 296 Fed. 506, and cases
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broad in their interpretation of "trade" under this section. It is
deemed to include such occupations as banking, insurance, travel
bureaus, journalism, etc.
NON-QUOTA IMMIGRANTS
Section 4 exempts five classes from the numerical restrictions
of the Act. The first exemption, in paragraph (a), is for the
benefit of non-quota relatives, i.e. "An immigrant who is the un-
married child under 18 years of age, or the wife, of a citizen of
the United States who resides therein. . . ." The Chinese
wife of such an American citizen applied for entry under this
section. She was rejected on the ground that she was ineligible
to citizenship and therefore excluded by Section 13 (c). That
section makes exception of non-quota immigrants, "under the
provisions of subdivision (b), (d), or (e) of section 4." The
familiar rule of construction--"zchlsio vni.s est cchxe.llo eltcr-
ius"-commands the finding that the relative class, [paragraph
(a) of Sec. 4] under such circumstances is barred from entry.
The Supreme Court so heldAr
Section 4 (b) exempts from the quota "an immigrant pre-
viously lawfully admitted to the United States, who is returning
from a temporary visit abroad." Tuch confusion has been caused
by the Department of Labor's ruling that "lawfully admitted"
means "lawfully admitted for permanent residence." r In other
words a temporary visitor, no matter how regular his admission,
cannot by going abroad for a short time re-enter with a new per-
manent status as a non-quota immigrant. This is a sound con-
clusion. This condition applies to all non-immigrants and to
students, but apparently not to ministers and professors.
57
Perhaps the most important ruling concerning non-quota
nationals, [Section 4 (c) I and non-quota ministers and professors,
[Section 4 (d)] relates to their wives and minor children, who,
under the law are entitled to the same non-quota status if accom-
panying or following to join their husbands or fathers. The
Department of Labor took the position that since the husband or
father derived his right from the 1924 Act only, the right of the
wife or child must be similarly derived, and exsted only if the
man arrived after that Act went into effect, namely, after June
30th, 1924.-' s The result is that if a minister entered the United
States on June 29th, 1924, his wife may not in following to join
Q
there cited. For Labor's ruling see Labor Rules of 1925, Rule 3, Subdivi-
sion H. par. 4.
Chang Chan, et. al. v. Nagl (1925) 268 U. S. 34G, 45 Sup. Ct. 540.
t This ruling has been accepted by the State Department. Sec G. I. C.
926, par. 119.
57Ibid.
55 See G. I. C. 926, pars. 129 and 139.
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him, enjoy non-quota status. But if that same man now steps
across the border and re-enters as a non-quota immigrant under
Sec. 4 (d), his wife may share his status. Although technically
defensible, the ruling is so absurd in operation that it is a satis-
faction to find that it has so far not been sustained by the courts."
The two Departments, in their published rulings, insist that a
non-quota student who "is working his way" through school, must
be deemed to have abandoned his status as a student. 0 Such a
ruling is believed to be entirely out of line with American institu-
tions. Most, if not all of our universities maintain student
employment bureaus; and it is well known that a great number of
students of necessity and without prejudice to their scholastic
work, seek employment in order to make an education possible.
Why an impecunious foreign student should be thus discriminated
against is not apparent. The law-enforcing officers must of
course be diligent to prevent the entry of unacademic immigrants
in student guise; but such a blanket rule as that promulgated goes
too far. It is believed that in practice the rule has been relaxed.
The student class is one of the most desirable for the United
States to cultivate. No other single group can contribute so much
to promoting friendly relations between this and other countries.
Coming here during a most impressionable period, they carry
home an intelligent appreciation of America and American insti-
tutions. Information, knowledge and understanding are the most
potent opponents of national prejudice. Our present restrictions
upon foreign students are so onerous that they are fast being
diverted to the universities of other more hospitable lands.
American materialism has made one concession; aliens desiring
to proceed to the United States for training in "well-known bank-
ing or industrial institutions for a temporary but protracted
period" are classified as "business pupils" and admitted as non-
immigrants under Sec. 3 (2). The Department of Labor usually
grants them the extension necessary to complete their work or
study, providing them with a treatment more lenient than that
accorded the usual temporary visitor. It is unnecessary to ex-
plain that a non-immigrant's path is not beset with so many
technicalities and difficulties as is that of a non-quota student.
This practice is commendable per se; but it is to be regretted
that a "business pupil" in the laboratories of the General Electric
Company should be more favorably treated than a student at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. If the rule against out-
59 United States ex. rel. Duner v. Curran (1925, C. C. A. 2d) 10 Fed. (2d)
38. It is understood that a petition for a writ of certiorari to review this
decision has been taken to the Supreme Court.
60 G. I. C. 926, par. 141; Labor Rules of 1925, Rule 9, Subdivision D.
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side employment were strictly enforced against students, the
contrast would be the more striking.L'
NATIONALITY
As under the 1921 Act, nationality, for the purpose of quota
allotment, is arbitrarily determined by place of birth entirely
regardless of citizenship. 2  The use of the word "nationality"
is perhaps unfortunate; but there can be no real objection to this
practical method of classification. Although the child of the Eng-
lish missionary born in Syria may suffer hardships by being
placed under the Syrian quota, yet it would lead to hopeless con-
fusion and difficulty if consular officers in each instance had to
pass judgment upon the actual nationality or citzenship of all
applicants. Certain exceptions to the general rule apply in the
cases of wives and minor children. The nationality of a minor
child "shall be" determined by the country of birth of the accom-
panying parent, or if both parents accompany, then by that of the
father. "If a wife is of a different nationality from her alien
husband and the entire number of immigration visas which may
be issued to quota immigrants of her nationality for the calendar
month has already been issued, her nationality may be deter-
mined by the country of birth of her husband if she is accompany-
ing him and he is entitled to an immigration visa, unless the total
number of immigration visas which may be issued to quota im-
migrants of the nationality of the husband for the calendar month
has already been issued." 63
These provisions were inserted to prevent the separation of
families. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the provision regard-
ing the child is mandatory rather than permissive. A child born
in Germany of a mother born in Poland might be able to get a
visa under the German quota at once, whereas only one visa might
be available for the mother under the Polish quota. To satisfy
the law they would have to travel separately. This section is
badly drafted, and should be amended to allow the child to ben-
efit by whichever quota is still open.
The State Department has made an excellent ruling based on
sound interpretation, concerning children who are non-quota na-
tionals, by reason of birth in an American country."I Even when
such children accompany a European-born parent, it is held that
the child nevertheless retains his non-quota status. "Section 4
61 As to "business pupils" see G. I. C. 926, par. 143. Attention should
alsd be called to "official students" who proceed to study in the United State3
directly under the auspices of a foreign government-a practice more com-
mon in the countries of the East. Such persons are wisely admitted as
government officials under Sec. 3 (1). See G. I. C. 926, par. 144.
62 Sec. 12 (a) of the Act and G. I. C. 926, par. 263.
03 Sec. 12 (a), (1) and (2).
64 Sec. 4 (c) of the Act.
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(c) grants non-quota status to certain persons. Section 12 (a)
(1) gives a rule for the determination of the quota to which to
charge certain aliens who are quota immigrants under the law." 0
An interesting situation arises regarding the wife's nationality
for quota purposes. Suppose the husband is already in America,
having prudently gone ahead to establish a home before having
her join him. ier quota is exhausted; his is not. He can return
to Europe and by accompanying his wife, enable her to get a num-
ber from his quota. The act says he must be "entitled to an
immigration visa"; but the State Department has held that this
refers merely to his general eligibility, and that he may be docu-
mented as a returning (non-quota) alien under Sec. 4 (b) .1'
The portion of Section 12 dealing with wives is permissive rather
than mandatory and therefore is not open to the objection raised
above. It seems absurd, however, to force the husband who is in
the United States to cross the Atlantic again merely to allow his
wife to benefit by his quota. Such an artificial situation should
be removed when the law is amended.
In drafting the Act, it seems that persons born in our insular
possessions, such as the Philippines and Porto Rico, were totally
forgotten. Where such persons are nationals of the United
States, it would seem clear that their entry should not be
restricted, since they are not aliens as.defined in Section 28 (b).
As defined in the Act, an immigrant is "any alien departing from
any place outside the United States destined for the United
States" except the non-immigrant classes already discussed07
Also by express definition the "United States" for the purposes
of the Act, includes Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands, but not the
Philippines. 68 Now assume a German subject born in the Philip-
pines, desiring to emigrate to the Continental United States,
leaves from a place which for the purposes of the Act is outside
the United States. He must therefore, presumably, be assigned
to a quota. But Sec. 12 (c) provides that "in case of changes in
political boundaries in foreign countries occurring subsequent to
1890 resulting in the transfer of territory from one country to
another, such transfer being recognized by the United States,
* * * aliens born in any territory so transferred shall be con-
sidered as having been born in the country to which such terri-
tory was transferred." The Philippines having been transferred
to the United States since 1890, our German, at first blush,
would seem to be considered as having been born in the United
65 G. I. C. 926, par. 131; see also par. 130.
65 G. I. C. 926, par. 269, 3. A returning alien may have in lieu of an im-
migration visa, a permit to re-enter issued under Sec. 10 of the Act; see
G. I. C. 926, par. 114; Labor Rules 1925, Rule 24, Subdivisions B, C, and D.
.7 See. 3 of the Act.
' Sec. 28 (a).
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States and therefore must be freely admitted without restriction
as a citizen thereof. This result is too unreasonable to be tenable,
even if it were not the fact that the whole tenor of See. 12 (c)
indicates that only changes in foreign territory are contemplated.
But it is equally clear that he cannot be charged to the quota for
Spain; and he therefore becomes a man without a quota. Let
our German be born in Porto Rico, which by definition is part of
the United States. Assume that he is now living in Brazil and
wishes to emigrate to the United States. Section 12 (a) says
"nationality shall be determined by country of birth"; shall we
then admit him as an American, without examination, numerical
limitation or visa? The result seems absurd. The only mention
in the Act,' of an alien born in the United States deals with one
who has lost his United States citizenship, and therefore is in-
applicable here. Again we have a man without a quota. Proba-
bly not many such cases "vill arise; but it is hard to believe that
Congress considered these eventualities and left the solution so
much in doubt. They must be deemed lacunae in the law, to be
filled by amendment rather than by administrative interpretation.
The Act has been criticized because it leaves so much to the
discretion or judgment of administrative officers abroad, com-
paratively free from review in our courts. The newspapers have
reported an attempt on the part of Countess Karolyi to mandamus
the Secretary of State to give her a visa, but such an attempt is
foredoomed to failure. As a matter of fact, the Act seems to
have worked very well in this particular. Consular officers are
human and therefore fallible; but they are generally intelligent
and conscientious. The new system inaugurated in the summer
of 1925 of establishing at the principal foreign ports, boards of re-
view composed of consular officers, an immigration official and a
public health officer, has been so successful that the original
experiment in the British Isles has been extended to Holland and
Belgium and doubtless will eventually spread over all the principal
69 Sec. 12 (a). The result of this provision is well illustrated by the
case of Ez parte (ING) Fung Sing (1925, W. D. Wash.) 6 Fed. (2d) 670.
A woman born in the United States of Chinese parents went to China
where she married a Chinaman in February, 1920. She thereby lot,
under Section 3 of the 1907 Act (34 Stat. at L. 1223), the American citizen-
ship which she acquired at birth. In 1924 her husband died and in the
following year she attempted to return to the United States to re3ume her
American citizenship. She was refused admission under See. 12 1a) an'l
13 (c) of the Act, on the ground that, being a person who had lost her
American citizenship, she must be considered to have been born in the
country of which she was then a citizen, namely in China, and as a perzon
of the Chinese race, she was ineligible to citizenship. It would seem that
-the case might have been decided without citing Section 12 (a), since the
raw making her ineligible to citizenship is based primarily upon racial
grounds rather than upon citizenship or place of birth. See (1026 35
YALE LAW JoRNAL, 626 for a discussion of this case.
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countries. The result of this system has been to reduce rejection
at the port of destination to a minimum.70
The Act is not perfect, but it is believed to be one of the most
humanitarian systems of restricted immigration ever devised.
It has on the whole been sensibly interpreted and administered.
Its amendment at this time seems doubtful; there is a legitimate
fear that the sleeping Pacific Coast dog might resume his inhospi-
table barking. Better to leave a few inperfections than to endan-
ger the foreign relations of the country. Numerous bills have
been introduced in the present Congress, many probably in
response to urgent demands from constituents who wish to lower
the bars for friends or relatives. Probably none of them will be
successfully passed through the Committees.
70 See State Dept. press communiques of July 7 and December 31, 1925.
